What Is the Free Will Defence for the Problem of Evil?
Question 2083.
The free will defence answers one of the oldest objections to Christian faith, that a good and powerful God should have prevented the moral evil we see in the world, by arguing that genuine human freedom, not any failure on God’s part, is the actual source of that evil.
I want to lay out how the argument actually works, where it succeeds, where its limits are, and why I hold it without embarrassment as someone who has never found the Calvinist alternative more satisfying on this particular question.
Stating the Problem the Argument Answers
The classical problem of evil runs roughly like this: if God is all powerful, he could prevent evil; if God is entirely good, he would want to prevent evil; evil exists; therefore God is either not all powerful, not entirely good, or does not exist. The free will defence targets the middle premise, arguing that a good God might have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil that he could have prevented.
The reason, on this defence, is that God gave humanity genuine freedom, and a world containing creatures with real moral freedom, capable of real love and real obedience, is a greater good than a world of pre-programmed creatures incapable of sin because incapable of choice at all.
Why Genuine Choice Requires Genuine Risk
The heart of the argument is that love freely given is worth more than obedience mechanically produced. A world in which God causes every choice, including every act of love and worship, would not actually contain love and worship in any meaningful sense, only the appearance of them.
Joshua’s challenge to Israel, choose this day whom you will serve, only makes sense as a genuine appeal if the choice itself is genuinely open. Scripture repeatedly addresses humanity as agents capable of real decision, not simply as instruments through which a predetermined script plays out.
Adam, Eve, and the First Exercise of Freedom
Genesis places a real, meaningful choice before Adam and Eve in the garden, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil standing as a genuine test rather than a foregone conclusion. Their thelema, their will, was engaged in a real decision with real consequences, and the Fall that followed was their choice, not God’s action performed through them.
This matters because it locates the origin of moral evil precisely where Scripture locates it, in human rebellion, rather than tracing it back through a chain of divine causation to God himself. The free will defence takes Genesis three at face value as an account of a genuine human choice with genuine consequences.
Answering the Objection From Divine Foreknowledge
A common objection asks how human choices can be genuinely free if God foreknows them in advance. I do not think foreknowledge and freedom are actually in tension here. God’s knowledge of what a free creature will choose does not cause that choice any more than my knowing a close friend well enough to predict his decision causes him to make it.
God’s foreknowledge is exhaustive and certain, but exhaustive certain knowledge of a free choice is not the same thing as determining that choice. The free will defence depends on maintaining this distinction, and I think Scripture maintains it too, holding both God’s complete knowledge of the future and genuine human responsibility for choices made within it.
Why I Prefer This to the Reformed Alternative
The Reformed tradition typically answers the problem of evil by appealing to a meticulous divine decree ordaining every event, including the Fall itself, for God’s ultimate glory. I find this answer creates a harder problem than it solves, because it makes God the ultimate author of the very evil the free will defence is trying to explain.
I would rather say plainly that Adam and Eve chose rebellion freely, that God permitted a genuine risk because a world of genuine love required genuine freedom, and that the responsibility for the Fall rests where Scripture places it, on the man and the woman who ate the fruit, not on a prior divine decree scripting their disobedience.
The Limits of the Free Will Defence
I want to be honest about where this argument does its work and where it does not. The free will defence explains moral evil, evil arising from human choice, reasonably well. It does less on its own to explain natural evil, earthquakes and disease, which do not obviously involve any creature’s free choice at the moment they occur.
For that second category, I think the doctrine of a historical Fall corrupting the created order itself, discussed more fully elsewhere, does the necessary work. The free will defence and the doctrine of a fallen creation are companions, not competitors, each covering a different part of the larger question.
A Future Where Freedom and Sinlessness Coexist
A fair question follows: if freedom explains the possibility of the Fall, will believers in the eternal state still be capable of sinning again? Scripture describes a future glorified state in which believers, whilst remaining genuinely free moral agents, are so transformed by the fullness of God’s presence and their own perfected character that sin no longer holds any attraction.
This suggests freedom itself is not the problem. An unformed, untested freedom facing temptation for the first time was the setting for the Fall. Freedom matured through redemption and glorification is the setting for eternal, willing, uncoerced faithfulness. The defence does not require that freedom always risk failure, only that it did in the particular, historical circumstances of Eden.
The Free Will Defence and Everyday Pastoral Care
I bring the free will defence into pastoral conversations more often than any purely academic setting, because it is usually a grieving or confused believer, not a philosophy student, who first asks me why God allowed a particular evil to happen. Being able to say honestly that God gave real freedom because real love required it, and that the misuse of that freedom is not his doing, gives people something steadier to hold onto than a vague appeal to mystery alone.
For related reading, see whether human beings genuinely have free will and how a historical Fall explains natural evil. Genesis 3 can be read in full at Genesis 3 on ESV.org, and the NET Bible’s notes on Joshua 24 discuss the covenant renewal context of Joshua’s challenge to choose.
Alvin Plantinga’s Formal Contribution to the Argument
The philosopher Alvin Plantinga gave the free will defence its most rigorous modern formulation, demonstrating with formal logical precision that the mere possibility of a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil, such as the value of creaturely freedom, is enough to defeat the claim that God’s goodness and the existence of evil are logically incompatible. Plantinga did not need to prove that free will actually is the reason God permits evil, only that it is possible, which is a considerably lower bar to clear and one that even most atheist philosophers have since conceded the free will defence successfully meets.
I bring Plantinga into a sermon or an apologetics conversation not because church members need the formal logical notation, but because his work shows that the free will defence is not a soft or simply devotional answer invented to comfort believers. It is a philosophically rigorous position that has substantially reshaped the academic conversation around the logical problem of evil since the 1970s, even among philosophers with no religious commitment of their own.
Distinguishing the Logical and Evidential Problems of Evil
It is worth distinguishing the logical problem of evil, which claims evil and God’s goodness are strictly incompatible, from the evidential problem of evil, which claims the sheer amount and intensity of evil in the world makes God’s existence simply improbable rather than logically impossible. The free will defence answers the first version decisively. It does less, on its own, to fully resolve the second, since even granting that freedom explains the possibility of evil, a thoughtful sceptic can still ask why so much evil, and evil of such terrible intensity, was necessary.
I do not think Scripture asks us to resolve every dimension of the evidential problem with a tidy formula. It asks us to trust the character of a God who entered his own creation’s suffering personally at the cross, which is a different kind of answer than a philosophical argument alone can supply, though the free will defence remains an honest and important part of the fuller response.
A Closing Reflection on Freedom Rightly Used
It is worth ending on the positive use of the very freedom this defence is built around. The same capacity for genuine choice that made the Fall possible also makes genuine love, worship, and obedience possible, freely offered rather than mechanically produced. I would rather live in a world where love is real, even at the cost of freedom’s misuse being real too, than in a world where neither love nor evil were ever genuinely possible at all.
C. S. Lewis and the Value Argument for Freedom
C. S. Lewis made a version of this argument accessible to a popular readership in The Problem of Pain, observing that a world of automata, however free from moral evil, would also be a world incapable of the love, self-sacrifice, and genuine goodness that give human existence its deepest meaning. Lewis’s illustration remains useful precisely because it appeals to ordinary intuition rather than technical philosophy. Most people, asked directly, would not actually prefer a world of programmed, guaranteed niceness over a world containing real risk alongside real, freely given love, once the trade-off is put to them plainly.
I find this everyday intuition worth drawing out in conversation, because it does real persuasive work that a formal syllogism alone cannot always achieve. Ask someone whether they would prefer a spouse who loves them because a switch was flipped, guaranteeing affection regardless of any genuine choice, or a spouse whose love is freely, continually chosen. Almost everyone, on reflection, wants the second option, even knowing that the same freedom which makes that love possible also makes betrayal possible. That ordinary intuition is, in miniature, exactly the logic behind the free will defence applied to the whole of creation.
A Final Word on Living Inside the Tension
I do not think the free will defence removes every discomfort this subject raises, and I would be suspicious of any argument that claimed to. What it does provide is a coherent, biblically grounded account of why a good, powerful God permitted the possibility of moral evil without himself being its author, an account that has satisfied thoughtful believers, and increasingly even careful philosophers outside the faith, for centuries.
A Final Summary Worth Restating
Drawing the argument together, the free will defence holds that a world containing creatures capable of real love necessarily includes creatures capable of real refusal, and that the refusal, when it came in Eden, was genuinely Adam and Eve’s own choice rather than a script authored for them by God. This defence answers the logical problem of evil convincingly, it locates responsibility for moral evil exactly where Genesis places it, and it coheres with a wider non-Calvinist reading of Scripture in which God’s own character remains untouched by the evil that his creatures, exercising a freedom he genuinely gave them, chose for themselves.
A Practical Word for Apologetic Conversations
When this subject comes up in conversation with a sceptical friend or colleague, I have found it far more fruitful to ask genuine, curious questions about what kind of world they would actually consider better than the one we have, rather than launching straight into a philosophical defence. Most people, pressed gently to describe an alternative world without any real freedom at all, quickly realise they are describing something considerably less appealing than they first assumed, which often does more persuasive work than any formal argument could achieve on its own.
A Further Word on Where This Leaves Us Practically
Practically speaking, this means I do not owe anyone, including myself on a difficult day, an explanation for every specific instance of suffering traced back to human choice. I owe them an honest account of why such choices remain possible at all, which the free will defence supplies clearly, and a compassionate presence in the specific grief the choice has caused, which no philosophical argument, however sound, was ever meant to replace on its own.
A Further Closing Reflection
I would add, finally, that holding this position does not require pretending the tension disappears entirely once the argument is understood. It requires only that the tension be held honestly, within a framework that keeps God’s own character untouched by the evil his creatures freely chose, which strikes me as a considerably better place to stand than either denying real freedom altogether or quietly attributing the Fall itself to God’s own hidden decree.
One More Note
I would rather offer a grieving friend this honest, if imperfect, framework than either a shallow dismissal of their pain or a theology that quietly makes God the author of the very evil they are suffering under, since neither of those alternatives has ever actually brought anyone lasting comfort in my experience of sitting with people through their hardest seasons.
A Closing Line
That, in the end, is the whole of what the free will defence sets out to establish, carefully and without overreach.
A Final Line
I hope that framework serves you as steadily as it has served me across many years of pastoral conversations on exactly this difficult subject.
One Last Line
I hold to it not as a complete theodicy but as an honest, biblically grounded piece of a much larger answer.
So, now what?
So if the problem of evil has ever unsettled your own faith, or been used against you in conversation with a sceptical friend, I would encourage you to press into the free will defence rather than reaching for a quicker, thinner answer. It takes human freedom seriously, it takes Genesis three seriously as history, and it keeps the responsibility for moral evil exactly where Scripture places it.
None of this removes the pain evil causes. But it does mean you are not left concluding that God either could not or would not do anything about it. He gave freedom because love required it, and the misuse of that freedom, not any failure in him, is where moral evil began.
“And if it is evil in your eyes to serve the LORD, choose this day whom you will serve… But as for me and my house, we will serve the LORD.”
Joshua 24:15 (ESV)
For Further Study
For further reading on the free will defence, see Charles Ryrie’s Basic Theology on the doctrine of humanity and sin, Lewis Sperry Chafer’s Systematic Theology on divine and human will, J. Dwight Pentecost’s and John Walvoord’s writing on divine rule and human responsibility, Millard Erickson’s Christian Theology for a full evangelical treatment of theodicy, and Arnold Fruchtenbaum’s material on the doctrine of man for a non-Calvinist reading of human freedom.
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